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EVALUATING TRANSFER PROGRAMS WITHIN A GENERAL 
EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK 
 




We set out a general equilibrium model for the evaluation of a domestically 
financed transfer program, which helps to combine the results from a computable general 
equilibrium model with disaggregated household data. We separate the indirect welfare 
impact into three components: (1) the redistribution effect arising from the need to 
finance programs, (2) the reallocative effect arising from the transfer of resources 
between households with different “tax propensities,” and (3) the distortionary effect 
arising from the need to use distortionary finance instruments. We show how all these 
effects can be usefully subsumed within one parameter, namely, the cost of public funds. 
Using a Mexican cash transfer program as an illustration, we use the approach to show 
that the substantial welfare gains that result from the switch from universal food subsidies 
to targeted cash transfers reflect both the improved targeting efficiency of the latter as 
well as a relaxation of the trade-off between equity and efficiency objectives when 
designing tax systems. More generally, the indirect costs of finance can be substantially 
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In response to budgetary pressures, many developing countries have recently 
moved (or are considering moving) to more targeted poverty alleviation programs.
1 A 
central component of these programs involves a transfer to “poor” households either in 
the form of a cash transfer or an infra-marginal subsidized ration. When evaluating the 
economic impact of such transfers, it is useful to separate these into direct and indirect 
income (or welfare) effects. The direct income effects reflect the design of the program 
(i.e., the rules for targeting transfers); these are often referred to as first-round effects and 
are captured by partial equilibrium approaches to policy evaluation. The indirect effects 
capture the second-round income changes brought about by the impact of cash transfers 
and their financing on the level and composition of demand and supply. In this paper we 
focus primarily on the indirect income effects, more particularly those that are a 
consequence of the need to finance the program domestically. We view this dimension of 
the program to be especially important since any credible poverty alleviation strategy 
must have a credible financing strategy underlying it. The latter, in turn, can have 
important consequences for the level and distribution of household incomes and 
economic welfare. 
 
                                                 
1 For example, the Programa Nacional de Educacion, Salud, y Alimentacion (PROGRESA) program in 
Mexico, the Programma de Asignacion Familiar (PRAF) program in Honduras, and the Red de Proteccion 
Social (RED) program in Nicaragua. Similar programs are being seriously considered by other Latin 
American countries, including Columbia and Argentina. 2 
The layout of the paper is as follows. In order to facilitate understanding of the 
sources of the indirect welfare effects, in the following section we set out a general 
equilibrium model that shows how one can separate these effects into three components. 
First, there is a redistribution effect due to the fact that someone must be taxed in order to 
pay for the cost of the transfer program. If high-income households bear the brunt of this 
taxation, and if we attribute a social value to a more equal distribution of income, then the 
resulting welfare cost will be less than the direct welfare gain from the transfers. Second, 
there is a reallocation effect that results from the fact that the pattern of demand will 
change if those who finance the program have income elasticities of demand different 
from those who receive the transfers. The resulting demand changes can have important 
consequences for government revenues when taxes vary substantially across 
commodities. The welfare effects arise essentially because demand shifts away from (or 
towards) commodities for which demand was previously too low due to their inefficiently 
high tax rates. Third, there is a distortionary effect because of the need to raise the 
revenue to finance the program through manipulating distortionary commodity taxes and 
subsidies. For example, if the program is financed by reducing distortionary subsidies, 
then this effect is positive, but if financed by increasing distortionary taxes, then it may 
be negative.  
Based on this model, in Section 3, we show how the results from a computable 
general equilibrium model can be combined with disaggregated data from household 
surveys to evaluate the full impact of such programs on social welfare. We further show 
how the three components can be usefully subsumed within one parameter, namely, the 3 
cost of public funds. In Section 4, we present an illustration of the approach, using data 
for Mexico to evaluate the recent redirection of their poverty alleviation strategy away 
from universal food subsidies towards targeted cash transfers. 
 
2. A THEORETICAL MODEL  
In this section we present a general equilibrium model of the economy that 
identifies the sources of the welfare impacts of cash transfer programs. Consider a simple 
economy made up of households, firms, and the government. We assume that welfare of 
household h is captured by a standard indirect utility function, V
h(q,w,m
h), where q is a 
vector of commodity prices, w is a vector of factor prices, and m
h is household lump-sum 
income (including government transfers, r






The budget constraint for each household is then given by q.x
h = w.f
h = m
h, where x and f 
are the demand for final goods and the supply of factors, respectively. Firms are assumed 
to operate under constant returns to scale so that supply is demand determined and profits 
are zero.
3 The government’s budget constraint is given by 
 
R ” t.x + t t.f - Sh  r
h + Sh T
h , 
                                                 
2 Throughout, we use bold type to denote vectors (small letters) and matrices (capital letters). 
3 To bring out the main sources of welfare changes, the model presented is simpler than the CGE model 
used in our illustration of the methodology below. More complex market structures, however, can be easily 
incorporated by replacing producer prices with shadow prices and actual government revenue with shadow 
government revenue (see Drèze and Stern 1987). However, the analysis as presented here will still go 
through with only minor changes. 4 
where t and t t are vectors of taxes on commodities consumed and factors supplied by 
households, respectively, and t = q – p, with p being a vector of producer prices. Since 
producer prices are assumed fixed, we have dq = dt. 
  The objective of the “social planner” is to introduce policy reforms that increase 










defined over H households.
4 In order to identify the various components of the total 
welfare impact of the program, it is useful to formally derive the welfare impact of cash 
transfers within the above framework. The problem the “social planner” then faces is to 
redistribute resources using the most efficient policy instruments from among a set that 
includes, for example, commodity taxes or subsidies, quantity rations, and cash transfers. 
The constraints facing the planner are the market equilibrium constraints that 
demand must equal supply as well as the government budget constraint. For ease of 
exposition, factor supplies (i.e., f) can be subsumed within the vector x with negative 
values if the household is a net supplier of these factors. As shown in Drèze and Stern 
(1987), using Walras’ law, the planner’s problem may be rewritten as 
 
                                                 
4 This specification has important implications for t he way in which we model the program below. In 
particular, the absence of public goods from the utility functions and the static nature of the specification 
means that to ensure consistency, we must keep both the supply of public goods and investment constant in 
our CGE model. 5 
  ￿ (s;w) ” W(…,V
h(s;w),…) + l R ,  (1) 
where s is a vector of policy instruments that are completely controlled by the planner 
and are chosen optimally, w w is a vector of policy instruments that are outside the 
planner’s complete control and that include the policy instruments highlighted above, and 
l is the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint (i.e., the marginal 
social—or shadow—value of government revenue). As before V
h(.) is the indirect utility 
function for h, and W(.) is a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. This 
formulation of the problem has the attraction of presenting the problem in terms of the 
standard trade-off between consumer welfare and government revenue. The impact of 
any “policy reform” on W(.) captures the direct welfare impact of the reform while the 
impact on revenue captures the indirect welfare impacts.
5 
This policy reform under consideration is a cash transfer program, dr ” {dr
h}. 
Differentiating equation (1) w.r.t. r, and noting the dm = dr, we get
6 
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h) is the social valuation of extra income accruing to h and Xm is a 
matrix with each household’s marginal budget shares across commodities as column 
                                                 
5 This implicitly assumes that the only distortions in the economy are government induced. Where other 
market imperfections exist, one needs to focus on “shadow revenue,” which captures income effects 
accruing outside the government budget. See Drèze and Stern (1987) for a detailed discussion. 
6 We also use the property tha the gradient of ￿ equals the gradient of V
*. 6 
entries. The first term captures the direct welfare impact of the cash transfer program as 
depicted by typical evaluations of such programs. The term in brackets is the net revenue 
cost of the program calculated as the program budget adjusted for any changes in revenue 
due to higher demands by these households. l is the social cost of the revenue used to 
finance the transfer and will depend on the set of instruments used to balance the budget. 
The sources of the indirect welfare effects will depend on how the program is to 
be financed. If it is to be financed by lump-sum taxes, T
h, then we have a similar equation 
as (2), replacing dr with dT. The net impact on welfare is then 
 
  ( ) ] . . . . [ T X t m X t m
m
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¶ ￿ l b  , 
 
where dm = (dr – dT). If lump-sum taxes exactly cover the indirect transfers, i.e., 
ShdT
h = Shdm
h, then we have 
 
  ( ) ] . . . . [ T X t r X t m
m
m m d d dT dr d
d
dW h h h
h - + - =￿ l b  ,  (3) 
 
where the first term captures the pure redistribution impact and the second captures the 
reallocation impact. If the reallocation effect is zero (e.g., if marginal budget shares are 7 
the same across households or if taxes are zero), then we are left with only a 
redistribution effect.
7 
Now, consider the program being financed by a change in indirect taxes, dt. Using 
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¶
. . . l b  .  (4) 
 
The first term indicates that households gain from the reform according to the 
level of their existing consumption, i.e., the existing level of demand gives a measure of 
this welfare effect in money terms. The direct impact on social welfare is greater the 
more that higher income households consume the commodities with the highest tax 
increases. Again, the social cost of raising revenue using a commodity tax is lower if 
households respond to the price change by switching demand away from (towards) 
relatively highly subsidized (taxed) commodities. Fully differentiating the budget 
constraint, setting x.dt = Shdr
h, and using the Slutsky decomposition, we get a net change 
in welfare due to the transfer program financed by commodity taxation as 
 
                                                 
7 In general, because of the presence of indirect revenue effects, we cannot solve out analytically for the 
vector dT, which keeps revenue constant. To do so, we would have to assume that marginal budget shares 
are constant across households. 8 
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W h h
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¶
¶ ￿ l l b  ,  (5) 
 
where x
c is the compensated demand function. Again, the first term is the redistribution 
effect, the second is the reallocation effect, and the third is the distortion effect of using 
distortionary taxes to finance the transfers.
8 
The above analysis identifies the source of the welfare impacts from a poverty 
alleviation cash transfer program financed domestically, identifying separately the equity 
(i.e., distribution) and efficiency (i.e., reallocation and distortion) impacts. It also 
provides a useful framework for interpreting the results from our analysis presented later 
in the text, especially in understanding the origin of the indirect welfare effects. 
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
To trace through the indirect effects of a transfer program, we need to specify the 
structure of the economy so as to identify how the changes in supply and demand that 
result from the transfers work themselves through the various commodity and factor 
markets. This includes specifying not only how equilibrium is restored in these markets 
but also specifying how equilibrium is restored to government finances as a result of both 
                                                 
8 When indirect taxes are set optimally, we further know that t.(¶x
c
i / ¶q/xi = bi/l, where bi is a weighted 





h), with the share of each household in the total consumption 
of commodity i as weights. See Coady and Drèze (2000) for a more detailed discussion. 9 
the direct and indirect impacts on government revenues and expenditures. These issues 
are addressed in this section. 
With regard to commodities one can consider a number of alternative market 
structures, with markets characterized either by 
 
1.  Fixed prices with markets clearing through quantity adjustment. This could be the 
case, for example, where excess capacity exists in the economy so that the extra 
demand generated by the transfers absorbs some of these “surplus” resources, thus 
generating Keynesian-type income multiplier effects (i.e., demand-led growth). 
Other indirect welfare effects may exist in the presence of domestic commodity 
and factor taxes. Alternatively, the extra demand may be satisfied through 
international trade flows (i.e., changes in the levels of imports and exports), with 
the indirect welfare effects being due to the presence of trade taxes. 
2.  Flexible prices with markets clearing through price adjustment. When the 
economy is characterized by full capacity, extra demands will, in general, result in 
price increases that bring about an appropriate reallocation of resources between 
sectors and consequent supply and demand changes. For given demand changes 
resulting from transfers, the more mobile are factors in and out of a sector, then 
the smaller the price change required to bring forth the necessary supply 
responses. Again, the indirect effects here operate through changing government 
revenue in the presence of commodity and factor taxes. 10 
In general, models with excess capacity generate relatively high (and positive) 
indirect effects: the more supply and demand are redirected towards commodities that 
utilize “surplus” resources in their production, the higher the magnitude of the positive 
welfare effects. In the absence of excess capacity, the general equilibrium welfare 
impacts will also depend on (1) the existing structure of taxes and subsidies (including 
price controls) on commodities and factors, and (2) how the transfers are financed (i.e., 
which combination of taxes or subsidies are changed). 
In order to identify the general equilibrium effects identified above, one can use a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the economy
9 and use the following 
two-step approach. First, the transfers are fed into the CGE model and we consider 
alternative market structures and budget-closure rules. Then the resulting direct and 
indirect income effects, as well as the price changes, are taken from the CGE model and, 
together with disaggregated household data, are used to calculate the impact on social 
welfare.
10 Using the model from the previous section, the social welfare effects of income 
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9 An alternative would be to use shadow prices in the place of such a fully articulated model of the 
economy. On this approach, see Little and Mirrlees (1974); Ahmad, Coady, and Stern (1988); Newbery and 
Stern (1987); and Coady (1997). 
10 See Drèze and Stern (1987) for a more detailed and complete description of such a model. 11 
where the first term captures the direct welfare effect from income transfers and the final 
two terms capture the indirect welfare effects coming through the resulting general 
equilibrium changes in commodity and factor prices. Defining b
h ” (¶W/¶m
h) and using 










h dq x de dm dW b b b ￿ ￿ - ￿ + ￿ =  ,  (6) 
 
where b
h is the so-called social marginal utility of income to household h (or “welfare 
weight”), de
h is the change in factor incomes, xi
h is the quantity of commodity i 
consumed by household h, and dqi, the corresponding price change. Multiplying and 
dividing both terms by total income y
h and the second term by qi, this can be rewritten as 
 




h - ￿i qi




h are the proportionate changes in household income due to the direct 
transfers and indirect income effects, respectively, ri, the proportionate change in the 
price of commodity i, qi
h is the share of expenditure on commodity i in the total 
expenditure of the household, and we use the household budget constraint. The term in 
brackets can be interpreted as the proportionate change in real incomes (i.e., nominal 
incomes minus a cost-of-living index). These proportionate changes are outputs from the 
CGE model and are then applied to household-level data. 12 
In order to apply the above approach, one needs to specify the term b
h. This can 









k is the income of a reference household (for which b
k = 1) and e can be 
interpreted as an “inequality aversion” parameter with concern for inequality increasing 
with e. For example, with e = 0, all welfare weights take the value unity so that extra 
income to all households is considered equally socially valuable. With e = 1, the social 
value of extra income to a household with twice the initial income of k is considered only 
as half as socially valuable as extra income to k. This welfare weight decreases to a 
quarter when e = 2 and so on.
11 
We now present a very simple model that suggests a very useful way of 
presenting the results of such an analysis.
12 Using equation (7) and subsuming both the 
indirect welfare effects (i.e., coming through both factor and commodity price changes) 
into one variable, dz, the welfare impact of the program can also be written as 
 




h ,  (7) 
 
                                                 
11 See Myles (1995, pp. 114-115) for more discussion. 

















is the adjusted cost of public funds, i.e., the social welfare cost of raising one unit of 
government revenue (l) multiplied by a tax propensity (h) that adjusts for the fact that 
households spend the extra income from transfers on taxed (or subsidized) commodities, 
thus decreasing (increasing) the amount that needs to be raised to balance the budget. As 
above, dm
h is the direct cash transfer to household h, ￿hdm
h is the program budget, and 
b
h is the social valuation of this transfer. The first term on the right-hand-side of equation 
(7) is then the direct welfare impact and the second is the indirect welfare impact of the 
program. The magnitude of the indirect effect is determined by the magnitude of l
*. If 
the government is unconcerned about income distribution (e.g., either because incomes 
are already equalized or e = 0, then b
h = 1(= b) for all households. If, in addition, the 
transfers (and other government revenue needs) are financed by nondistortionary lump-
sum taxes, then we have l = 1(= b). The program then results in no overall change in 
welfare. 
However, if, instead, the transfers have to be financed by introducing 
distortionary taxes, then we have b = 1 and l
*>1, so that the net welfare impact is 
negative due to an indirect distortionary effect capturing the so-called “deadweight 14 
losses” associated with taxes. If distortionary taxes already existed, then the sign of l will 
depend on whether these were optimally set or not and which taxes (subsidies) are 
increased (decreased) to finance the program. If, initially, taxes were set optimally, then 
l
*>1 and welfare decreases.
13 If, instead, the program is financed by the removal of 
distortionary subsidies, then l
*<1, and welfare increases. If, initially, taxes were not set 
optimally, then l
*>1 (l
*<1) if the program is financed by raising taxes that were initially 
too high (low). In the presence of an inefficient tax structure, one also gets reallocation 
effects if income elasticities differ across those received and financing the budget. For 
example, if the poor (who receive transfers) have a relatively high propensity to consume 
highly taxed commodities from extra income, then this will decrease l
*, since the net 
revenue costs of financing the program will be lower (i.e., h < 1). 
Even if the two efficiency effects are zero (e.g., due to the availability of lump-
sum transfers), l
* can still differ from unity if income distribution is suboptimal. If, in 
such a situation, the incidence of taxation falls on relatively low-income (high-income) 
households, then l
* > 1 (l
* < 1), reflecting a higher (lower) social cost of raising revenue. 
The belief that l
* < 1 is obviously the central motivation for such transfer programs in the 
first place. 
We are interested in determining the overall welfare impact of the actual transfer 
program, but also in comparing across alternatives. For example, in our illustration 
                                                 
13 Optimal taxation requies that, for all taxes under the control of the policymaker, the deadweight loss 
from raising extra revenue (i.e., l) is equalized across all tax instruments 15 
below, the actual program is the transfer program financed by a reduction in food 
subsidies and the alternatives reflect alternative financing scenarios, namely, alternative 
reforms of the value-added tax (VAT) system. In order to motivate the manner in which 
we present our results, it is useful to rearrange equation (7). Since the direct welfare 
impact is common across all (i.e., the actual and alternative) programs, one can 
equivalently compare the welfare impacts by comparing the benefit-cost ratios of 





























j is the social cost of raising the revenue to finance the program (i.e., one for 
each of the actual and alternative financing strategies, j), a
h is the transfer received by 
household h as a proportion of the transfer budget, and lD is a weighted average of 
household bs, since ￿ha = 1. One can also interpret lD as the welfare impact of the direct 
transfers and l
*
j as the welfare cost of the indirect income effects.
14 In principle, one 
should choose the program with the highest qj > 1; i.e., conditional on benefits exceeding 
costs, one chooses the program that exhibits the lowest social cost of delivering these 
                                                 
14 The term lD is analygous to what is commonly referred to as the distributional characteristic of policy 
instruments or programs (Feldstein 1972). It is straightforward to show that lT = alD + (1 - a)lI, where lT 
is the distributional characteristic of the full program, lI is that of the indirect program component, and a is 
the share of the direct income transfers in the total (i.e., direct plus indirect) income effect of the program. 
One can also easily show that lI = l
*lD(a/1 - a). 16 
benefits. Or, in other words, qj is the social return to every dollar raised to finance the 
program. Below, we present results for lD, l
*
j, and qj across alternative financing 
scenarios and different degrees of aversion to inequality (i.e., values of e). 
 
4. AN ILLUSTRATION FOR MEXICO 
In this section, we provide an illustration of the above approach by way of an 
evaluation of the recent shift in policy emphasis in Mexico’s poverty alleviation strategy 
away from universal food subsidies towards targeted cash transfers. We start by 
providing a very brief description of the data underlying the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model and the key features of this model. We then present the results 
from alternative policy simulations of a cash transfer program financed domestically. 
 
DATA AND CGE MODEL 
The CGE model used in this analysis relies on a social accounting matrix (SAM) 
of Mexico for 1996.
15 The data were first collected as a national SAM, which was then 
divided into five regions. The model is able to capture differences among the regions in 
terms of production and consumption patterns, in a “top-down” approach: rather than 
having complete regional SAMs, the model regionally disaggregates the national SAM 
only by production and factor markets and households. 
                                                 
15 See Harris (2000) for details on the construction of the SAM. 17 
The model includes four rural regions, North, Central, Southwest, and Southeast, 
which produce only primary agricultural products. There is one “national” urban region, 
which comprises all of the urban areas of Mexico, regardless of geographical location. 
Each region has 3 households, defined as poor, medium, or rich, according to the income 
tercile into which they fall. The urban area produces processed agricultural goods and 
other goods and services. Generally, the North region produces more high-valued 
agriculture, in particular fruits and vegetables, much of which is exported. Agriculture 
production relies on more irrigated land use, and households are wealthier. The Southeast 
region is poorest, more of the land used is non-irrigated, and there is less commercial 
farming. The Central and Southwest regions are a mixture of the first two, with a range of 
subsistence and commercial farming and agricultural technology. These two areas also 
produce the largest amounts of basic grains and beans. Appendix Table 3 lists the sectors 
used in the model. 
There are four types of nonagricultural labor: professional, white-collar, blue-
collar, and unskilled/informal, and four agricultural labor categories differentiated by 
region. The agricultural activities employ only agricultural labor and nonagricultural 
activities do not use any agricultural labor. Each rural region uses two types of land, 
irrigated and non-irrigated, for a total of eight land types. There is one capital category, 
used by all sectors.  
The government and the enterprise account already alluded to are the other 
domestic institutions in the SAM. The government, which is national, collects seven 
types of taxes: a value-added tax, a producer tax, an export tax, a sales tax, an import 18 
tariff, a payroll tax, and an income tax. It receives transfers from the rest of the world and 
provides transfers to households and enterprises. The rest of the world account provides 
transfers to households, buys Mexico’s exports, and sells its imports. In Appendix Table 
4, we present some useful summary statistics of the data used in the analysis.  
The CGE model used in this study follows the sectoral and socioeconomic 
structure of the SAM described above.
16 The CGE model is neo-classical in spirit with 
agents responding to price changes, reflecting our central focus on the general 
equilibrium effects arising from the need to finance the program domestically (i.e., there 
are no surplus resources in the economy or distortions other than taxes). The model is 
Walrasian, determining only relative prices. Product prices, factor prices, and the 
equilibrium exchange rate are defined relative to the consumer price index, which serves 
as the price numeraire. The country is “small” in the sense that it takes world prices as 
given.  
The production technology is a nested function of constant elasticity of 
substitution (for factors within value-added) and Leontief functions (for intermediate 
inputs and value-added). Producers decide to supply their output to either the export or 
domestic market according to a constant elasticity of transformation function, which 
permits some degree of independence from international prices. The composite 
consumption good is also a constant elasticity of substitution function of imported and 
domestically produced commodities. This aggregation, known as the Armington function, 
                                                 
16 See Coady and Harris (2000) for a full description of the CGE model. 19 
permits imperfect substitutability between imported and domestically produced goods 
and, therefore, two-way trade. 
Households receive income from factor payments (land, labor, and capital 
payments) net of factor taxes, government transfers, and transfers from the rest of the 
world. They consume goods according to a linear expenditure function, purchasing goods 
from the market as well as from home production (in rural areas only). They also pay 
taxes on their monetary income and save a share of their total income. Government 
income is the sum of all taxes: direct taxes on households and enterprises, value-added 
taxes, producer taxes, import tariffs, export taxes, social security taxes, and sales taxes. 
The macroeconomic accounts are balanced as follows. The choice of government 
budget closure will depend on the simulation being performed; in all cases, government 
(dis)savings will be held fixed, as will real government spending. One of the tax 
instruments will be free to adjust to keep government savings at its base-line level. This 
will allow us to perform government budget-neutral experiments without having 
government purchases of goods and services affect the welfare analysis. Similarly, in the 
savings-investment balance, real investment will be held fixed, and the marginal 
propensity to save equilibrates the account. The current account is balanced by the 
exchange rate, so that any welfare effects are not based on changes in foreign flows. In 
the factor markets, labor and land are mobile across sectors and capital is fixed, giving 
the model a medium-term time frame. 
 20 
SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
In this section, we very briefly describe our policy simulations and then evaluate 
their impacts on welfare. As mentioned earlier, this involves taking the indirect welfare 
impacts from the CGE analysis and superimposing them on the household-level data. The 
program is modeled as a poverty alleviation program that transfers income to “poor” 
households in rural areas, equivalent to a 30 percent increase in their nominal incomes 
and 2 percent of aggregate consumption. The total welfare impact of such a program will 
depend on how it is financed and we consider a number of alternatives. The actual source 
of finance is the elimination of food subsidies. In the base run of the model, subsidies on 
Manufactured Maize, Manufactured Wheat, and Dairy Manufacturing imply a consumer 
subsidy on these goods of 25 percent, 20 percent, and 20 percent, respectively. The other 
alternatives considered involve various reforms of the value-added tax (VAT) system. 
The present VAT system is modeled as having three rates: 0 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent on agriculture/processed foods, light manufacturing/ intermediate goods, and 
consumer durables/capital goods, respectively (Table 1).  
We consider the following VAT reforms as alternative ways to finance the 
program: 
 
1.  Proportional Increase (PVAT): in all VAT rates to 0 percent, 7.5 percent, and 15 
percent, respectively. 
2.  Increase High Rate (HVAT): from 10 percent to 16 percent. 21 
3.  Uniform Top Rate (TVAT): with the top two rates made uniform at 11 percent. 
4.  Uniform Bottom Rate (BVAT): with the bottom two rates made uniform at 7 
percent. 
5.  Uniform Single Rate (SVAT): with an 8.3 percent rate on all goods. 
 
Table 1. Description of value-added tax (VAT) experiments 
    Low rate
a    Middle rate
b    High rate
c 
VAT experiment  Description  (percent)    (percent)    (percent) 
             
Base  --  0.0      5.0      10.0 
PVAT  Proportional increase in Base VAT rates  0.0      7.3      14.6 
HVAT  Increase in high rate only  0.0      5.0      16.1 
TVAT  Uniform top rate  0.0      11.4      11.4 
BVAT  Uniform bottom rate  7.2      7.2      10.0 
SVAT  Single rate  8.3      8.3      8.3 
a Low rate is applied to all raw agricultural, processed agricultural, and other food activities. 
b Middle rate is applied to Light Manufacturing, Intermediate Goods, and Professional Services activities. 
c High rate is applied to Capital Goods, Consumer Durables, Construction, and Commerce, Trade and 
Transportation activities. 
 
The basic approach is to compare the social costs of raising the necessary revenue 
to finance the program (the “cost of public funds,” l
*
j) with those of the actual financing 
instrument, i.e., the elimination of food subsidies, as well as with the program benefit 
(i.e., lD). 
The results of our simulations are presented in Table 2.
17 We start by comparing 
the cost of public funds across alternative financing packages for e = 0, i.e., where we are 
concerned only with the efficiency aspects of the program and not with its impact on the 
                                                 
17 We use the dollar sign ($) to denote Mexican pesos. 22 
distribution of income or poverty. It is clear that, from an efficiency perspective, 
financing the program by reducing subsidies dominates with the cost of raising $100 
being only $62. In other words, every $100 raised to finance the program increases 
welfare (and GDP) by $38. These substantial welfare gains result from the elimination of 
a highly distortionary subsidy. This compares extremely favorably with the alternative 
forms of VAT financing.  
 
Table 2. Social cost of public funds 


















               
e = 0  1  0.625  1.061  1.071  1.051  0.969  0.955 
e = 0.5  1.242  0.468  0.732  0.751  0.718  0.668  0.685 
e = 1  1.584  0.397  0.611  0.633  0.602  0.560  0.599 
e = 2  2.792  0.395  0.658  0.679  0.664  0.612  0.690 
e = 3  5.448  0.557  1.023  1.045  1.054  0.970  1.109 
e = 4  11.549  0.996  1.962  1.988  2.042  1.882  2.155 
e = 5  26.011  2.060  4.227  4.263  4.425  4.082  4.671 
 
 
Two of the VAT alternatives, i.e., SVAT and BVAT, also result in welfare gains, 
with the cost of raising $100 being $95 if financed by a move to a single uniform VAT 
rate or $97 if financed by a move towards a uniform VAT rate in the place of the bottom 
two rates. These efficiency gains arise from the reform in the VAT structure. In general, 
the inefficiency associated with a tax system is minimized by having relatively higher 23 
rates on commodities with relatively low own-price elasticities of demand.
18 Since basic 
food items tend to have low price elasticities, shifting taxes towards these commodities 
will tend to increase welfare and this is what happens in both the case of SVAT and 
BVAT. Our results tell us that the gains resulting from thus reforming the VAT structure 
outweigh the welfare losses from the higher average rate required to finance the program. 
The other VAT alternatives considered all have a cost of public funds greater than 
unity, ranging between $105-$107 per $100 of revenue raised. All of these involve an 
increase in the VAT rates of one or both of the top two VAT rates and the commodities 
falling within these rates tend to be the most price elastic. These welfare losses mean that, 
in the absence of any social value being attached to any improvement in the income 
distribution, such a program would be welfare decreasing. However, not only are 
distributional concerns the motivating force for the program in the first place, but they 
also tend to be the motivation behind tax structures that exhibit high tax rates on low 
price-elastic luxuries typically consumed disproportionately by higher-income 
households. Therefore, any evaluation of the program should explicitly address this issue. 
Introducing distributional concerns involves analyzing the results for values of 
e > 0. The cost of public funds for a number of financing instruments is presented in 
Figure 1: in order to avoid clutter, we focus on only three of the VAT alternatives, i.e., 
the most inefficient system (HVAT) and the two most efficient systems (BVAT and 
                                                 
18 We are implicitly assuming that cross-price elasticities are zero or sufficiently small as to make this 
general rule of thumb valid. See, for example, Coady and Drèze (2000) and Myles (1995) for more detailed 
discussion. 24 
SVAT), along with subsidy financing. The first thing to notice is that once we introduce 
even a little concern for income distribution (e.g., e = 0.5), the cost of raising a peso 
becomes substantially less than one peso for all financing instruments. This reflects the 
fact that the indirect income effects are distributed in favor of the poor at the expense of 
the nonpoor. The second thing to notice is that the relationship between the cost of public  
 












funds and e is U-shaped, with the former beginning to rise after e = 1. Eventually, at 
around e = 3, the cost of public funds goes above unity. This pattern indicates that 
although the tax incidence is lowest for the poor as a whole, it is relatively high for the 
poorest of the poor, and the greater the weight we place on the income of the poorest, the 
higher the social cost of raising revenue through the alternative VAT instruments. 
Although the cost of financing the program through reducing subsidies follows 
the same U-shaped pattern, it remains the most attractive form of finance throughout. In 
fact, for higher values of e, it also appears to be the least regressive form of financing. 
This is brought out clearly in Figure 2, which shows the benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) across 
the instruments discussed above. The higher the value of e, the more attractive subsidy 
reductions look relative to VAT financing. For example, at only moderate levels of 
aversion to income inequality, the BCR with subsidy financing is about four, i.e., every 
$100 raised to finance the program increases welfare by $400, a very high social return 
by any standard. But even the BCRs for VAT financing increase monotonically with e, 
reflecting the targeting of the transfers at poor households. This brings out one of the 
main attractions of the program, i.e., the fact that it is very efficiently targeted. More 
generally, it indicates the potential return in welfare terms from introducing a more 
efficiently targeted transfer program. The presence of such a program enables one to 
design a more efficient tax system by lessening the need to trade off efficiency goals 
against equity objectives, e.g., by reducing the need for high subsidies on necessities or 
high taxes on price-elastic luxuries that exist for equity reasons. More generally, it is also 26 
clear that the indirect cost of the transfer program can be substantially reduced if the 
program can be combined with reform of an initially inefficient tax system. 
 
Figure 2. Benefit-cost ratios 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Most analyzes of the welfare impact of cash transfers have essentially been 
undertaken within a partial equilibrium framework that focuses exclusively on the direct 














general equilibrium perspective of the program. In particular, we focus in on the indirect 
welfare effects that arise from the need to finance the program domestically. This focus is 
motivated by the belief that any credible poverty alleviation strategy must have a credible 
financing strategy underlying it. 
We first show how the indirect effects arising from the need for domestic 
financing can be separated into three components: (1) the redistribution effect due to 
some households being taxed to finance the transfers to households, (2) the reallocation 
effect, which results when those financing the program have different consumption 
patterns (or income elasticities) from those receiving the transfers, so that there is a 
second-round effect on government revenue when taxes differ across commodities, and 
(3) the distortionary effect, which arises when the program is financed by manipulating 
distortionary taxes and subsidies. The first effect can be viewed as capturing the equity 
implications of the program and the last two effects as capturing the efficiency 
implications. 
Based on the above model, we show how the results from a CGE analysis of 
domestically financed cash transfers can be super-imposed on disaggregated household 
data to evaluate the total welfare impact of the program. We show how the three separate 
components of the indirect income effects can be subsumed within one parameter, the 
(adjusted) cost of public funds. This term represents the welfare cost of financing the 
program and should be compared to the welfare benefit from the transfers as captured by 
the commonly used distributional characteristic. We construct a benefit-cost ratio defined 
as the distributional characteristic of the direct transfers divided by the (adjusted) cost of 28 
public funds. Our illustration, based on Mexico’s recent reform of its poverty alleviation 
strategy, clearly shows that the move from universal food subsidies to targeted transfers 
has two sources of benefit: (1) the introduction of a more distributionally powerful 
transfer policy instrument, and (2) the fact that this reduces the need to trade off equity 
objectives against efficiency objectives when designing the tax system. More generally, 
the welfare cost of funding such programs can be substantially lowered when they are 
accompanied by reforms of the tax system. 
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Table 3. National sectors in model 
1.  Maize 
2.  Wheat 
3.  Beans 
4.  Other Grains (Sorghum, Barley) 
5.  Fruits and Vegetables 
6.  Other crops (Tobacco, Hemp, Cotton, Cocoa, Sugar, Coffee, Soy, Safflower, Sesame, and Others) 
7.  Livestock/Forestry/Fisheries (Bovines, Goats, Sheep, Bees, Poultry and Others, Forestry and Fisheries) 
8.  Diary 
9.  Prepared Fruits and Vegetables 
10.  Wheat Manufacturing 
11.  Corn Manufacturing 
12.  Sugar Manufacturing 
13.  Other Processed Foods (Coffee Manufacturing, Processed Meats, Oils and Fats, Feeds, Alcohol, Beverages, and 
Others 
14.  Light Manufacturing (Lumber, Wood, Paper, Print, and Cigar Manufacturing, Soft Fiber Textiles, Hard Fiber 
Textiles, Other Textiles, Leather, Apparel) 
15.  Intermediates (Chemicals, Synthetics, Rubber, Glass, Cement, Fertilizers, Other Chemicals, Oil Refining, Oil and 
Gasoline, Petrochemicals, Coal, Iron, Non-Ferrous Metal, Sand/Gravel, Minerals) 
16.  Consumer Items (Pharmaceuticals, Soaps, Plastic, Metal Furnishings, Household Appliances, Electronic 
Equipment, Automobiles and Parts) 
17.  Capital Goods (Metal Products, Metal Manufacturing, Non-Electronic Machines, Electronic Machines, Other 
Electric Goods, Transportation Materials, Mineral Manufacturing, Iron Manufacturing, Non-Ferrous Metal 
Manufacturing, Others) 
18.  Professional Services (Professional Services, Education, Medical, Finance/Real Estate, Public Administration and 
Defense, Electricity, Gas, and Water) 
19.  Other Services (Other Services, Restaurants) 
20.  Construction 
21.  Commerce, Trade, and Transportation 
  
Table 4. Summary statistics 




a  VAT  Sales tax  Tariff 
Export 
tax  Output 
Domestic 






                       
Maize  0.000  --  0.006  0.012  0.007  0.62  0.83  1.17  0.03  0.85  24.19 
Wheat  -0.571  --  0.000  0.007  0.032  0.12  0.12  0.00  0.01  1.44  0.07 
Beans  -0.003  --  0.008  0.009  0.006  0.11  0.10  0.14  0.17  29.03  24.37 
Other grain  -0.449  --  0.000  0.000  0.008  0.16  0.16    0.00  0.15   
Fruits and vegetables  -0.001  --  0.006  0.000  0.018  0.75  0.64  0.32  0.95  23.43  8.55 
Other crops  -0.002  --  0.007  0.016  0.006  0.84  0.77  1.55  1.89  41.72  34.75 
Livestock  0.001  --  0.008  0.014  0.033  2.20  2.21  0.39  0.42  3.53  3.00 
Dairy  -0.308  --  0.008  0.005  0.007  1.81  1.89  0.56  0.12  1.18  5.04 
Maize manufacturing  -0.308  --  0.008  0.018  0.007  1.47  1.47  0.02  0.10  1.28  0.28 
Wheat manufacturing  -0.308  --  0.008  0.030  0.006  1.13  1.03  0.17  0.70  11.54  2.75 
Prepared fruits and vegetables  0.002  --  0.006  0.017  0.009  0.30  0.20  0.18  0.69  43.62  15.60 
Sugar  0.002  --  0.005  0.034  0.023  0.40  0.41  0.35  0.30  14.09  14.94 
Other food  0.002  --  0.008  0.016  0.007  4.29  4.46  3.38  2.50  10.81  13.01 
Light manufacturing  0.002  0.05  0.007  0.027  0.009  5.50  5.73  11.78  10.27  34.71  35.29 
Intermediates  0.002  0.05  0.006  0.016  0.019  5.43  5.57  12.50  11.44  39.14  38.54 
Capital goods  0.002  0.10  0.007  0.021  0.012  7.36  9.89  46.26  30.68  77.52  80.23 
Construction items   0.002  0.10  0.007  0.023  0.006  11.96  8.41  21.24  39.74  61.78  43.33 
Construction  0.003  0.10  0.006  --  --  5.24  5.28  --  --  --  -- 
Professional services  0.007  0.05  0.008  --  --  19.96  20.15  --  --  --  -- 
Other services  0.004  --  0.009  --  --  11.15  11.27  --  --  --  -- 
Commerce  0.003  0.10  0.009  --  --  19.22  19.43  --  --  --  -- 
a A negative entry for the producer tax represents a producer subsidy. 
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